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Through the power of precedent, international incidents involving the use of 
force help to clarify the meaning and interpretation of jus ad bellum, the 
corpus of rules arising from international custom and the United Nations 
Charter that govern the use of force. UN Charter Article 2(4) forbids states 
from using force in their international relations. Exceptions to this prohibition 
are acts taken in self-defence under UN Charter Article 51 or under the 
auspices of a UN Security Council authorization to use force under Article 42. 
States can also consent that another state use force in its territory, for example 
to combat rebel or terrorist actors. In certain cases, state practice gives rise to 
new interpretations of existing rules or novel exceptions emerge. Through the 
study of precedents scholars often consider whether or not there has been a 
shift in the legal landscape. To give but a few illustrations, commentators 
have questioned if States can take measures of self-defence under Article 51 to 
protect nationals abroad (a justification that has been invoked at various 
moments, for instance by Russia in the context of the crisis in Georgia in 
2008), if a right to humanitarian intervention has emerged (a discussion 
triggered by the Kosovo crisis in 1999), or if self-defence under Article 51 can 
be invoked against non-state actors (a topical debate in the post 9/11 era). 
Consequently, depending on the precedent’s facts and the arguments invoked 
by the main protagonists different legal issues can be triggered.  
 
When analysing legal precedents scholars generally follow the same outline. 
They begin by laying out the context within which the incident involving the 
use of force took place. They then provide an assessment of the legal positions 
invoked by the main protagonists within the framework of the laws 
governing the use of force, and in particular the regime of the United Nations 
Charter. After which they conclude by providing an overview of the legal 
issues triggered by the precedent and the extent to which the incident affected 
the legal landscape of the jus ad bellum. Despite this standard procedure, legal 
academics never treat the legal framework governing the use of force in the 
same manner. This is not simply due to the variety of precedents in terms of 
facts, actors, and legal arguments. Each analyst’s approach is personal and 
unique, and inevitably discusses and analyses precedents in an original 
manner. Two scholars may apply themselves to the same case study and 
reach different conclusions on its precedential value and its impact on the 
legal landscape, particularly if they apply different methodologies. Law may 
constitute an objective set of rules but its interpretation and application lie in 
the eyes of the beholder. 
 
This phenomenon reveals the elasticity of the legal framework governing the 
use of force. To clarify elasticity does not mean that the law can be expanded 
or manipulated at will. A rubber band can be stretched into many shapes and 
return to its original form once the forces that distorted it are removed. 
Stretch a rubber band too far, however, and it will snap. Very often, 
throughout various incidents involving the use of force, the core rules 
governing the jus ad bellum are stretched into different shapes by each 
precedent’s main protagonists as well as by the authors analysing it but never 
in a manner that causes the framework to break down. 
 
An obvious illustration is the debate on whether or not self-defence can be 
invoked against non-state actors. UN Charter Article 51 provides that self-
defence can be invoked only in response to an armed attack against a UN 
member state. Because Charter Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force in 
international relations, the author of an armed attack is traditionally 
understood as another state and not a non-state actor such as a terrorist 
group. The implication of this state-centric reading is that states cannot 
invoke the use of force in self-defence against non-state actors unless the 
actions of the group can be attributed to a state under the law of state 
responsibility. If a state is the victim of a terrorist act by a group that is in the 
territory of another state it can protect itself by entering into cooperation with 
the territorial state – which could lead to intervention by invitation or with 
the consent of the territorial state – or by referring the matter to the UN 
Security Council – which could eventually trigger an authorization to use 
force under UN Charter Article 42. Today the question of a shift in the legal 
landscape dominates the debate. Precedents that have occurred in the 
aftermath of 9/11 and in the context of the bombings against ISIL/Da’esh 
appear to challenge the above-described interpretation of Article 51 and the 
applicability of the right to self-defence. The debate amongst legal scholars 
rages on as they reach different conclusions through their study of 
precedents. Just as states tug at Article 51 in one direction or another, 
scholars’ interpretations of the rule pull it into different directions as well.  
 
Since the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, in spite of the different forces 
that have pulled at the regime the rules governing the use of force appear to 
maintain their original shape, with little deformation. The exceptions to the 
prohibition of the use of force may shift over time as the law adjusts to the 
context of international politics but the prohibition remains in place. A rule 
may eventually be tugged in one direction, but never too far from its original 
conception. Fundamentally this elasticity is a practical illustration of how law, 
while indeed limited by the reality of international relations, strives to 
maintain international peace in service of the best interests of all concerned. 
